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The purpose of this paper is to study a new concept of equilibrium, called 
equilibrium with quantity targets, in an economy with increasing returns to scale. 
This concept is introduced by E. Dierker and W. Neuefeind (J. Math. Econom. 17 
(1988)). We extend this definition to the case of a general production model and we 
provide an existence theorem. Furthermore we state an existence result in the 
particular model considered by Dierker and Neuefeind which improves their 
result. 6 1990 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, several papers have provided existence results of equilibria in 
economies with increasing returns in which the producers follow pricing 
rules such as the marginal cost pricing rule and the average cost pricing 
rule. Nevertheless, it is well known that such equilibria are far from an 
optimum understanding. Because of this, Dierker and Neuefeind [S] 
propose a new concept of equilibrium. They introduce in the description of 
the economy a public agency which insures that, at equilibrium, a certain 
net production of the outputs is achieved. 
The purpose of this paper is to study this concept of equilibrium, called 
equilibrium with quantity targets, in an economy with increasing returns to 
scale or, more generally, with nonconvexity in production. We extend the 
definition of Dierker and Neuefeind to the case of a general production 
model and we provide an existence result. Furthermore, using a result of 
Bonnisseau Cl,], we improve the result of Dierker and Neuefeind by 
removing some technical assumptions. 
There are two differences between an equilibrium where the producers 
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follow general pricing rules and an equilibrium with quantity targets. First, 
in an equilibrium with quantity targets, the total supply of the production 
sector is greater than the quantity requirement of the public agency. 
Second, the producers set the prices below the level suggested by their 
pricing rules, but, if the total supply exceeds the quantity target for some 
good, then the producers set a price according to their pricing rules. In 
general, one cannot expect the quantity targets to be compatible with the 
pricing rules. It is because of this fact that we do not impose equality 
between the prices given by the producers and the prices suggested by the 
pricing rules in the definition of an equilibrium with quantity targets. 
Nevertheless, if the total supply exceeds the quantity requirements for all 
goods, each producer follows its pricing rule and then an equilibrium with 
quantity targets is an equilibrium in the standard sense. 
We now present the main differences between our definition of equi- 
librium with quantity targets and the one of Dierker and Neuefeind. First, 
we use a more general model of economy since we do not assume that one 
can a priori distinguish the inputs from the outputs for the nonconvex 
producers. Second, in our model, the planning agency may impose quantity 
targets for all goods and not only for the outputs of the nonconvex sector. 
Third, we consider that some nonconvex producers which are not con- 
trolled by the public agency follow their pricing rules whereas, in the model 
of Dierker and Neuefeind, all the nonconvex producers must set lower 
prices than the one given by the pricing rules if this is necessary. 
Our formalization of the public agency allows us to describe different 
types of quantity targets. For example, one can assume that quantity 
requirements are made only for some goods or that the public agency is 
only interested in the supply of the controlled production sector and not in 
the supply of the whole production sector. 
Our existence result of equilibrium with quantity targets is inspired by 
the main existence theorem of Bonnisseau and Cornet [2]. Actually, we 
change only the assumption on the revenue of the consumer and we add 
an assumption on the quantity targets. The proof consists in defining 
extended pricing rules so that the economy with the auxiliary pricing rules 
verifies the assumptions of the existence theorem of Bonnisseau and Cornet 
[2] and in checking that the equilibrium with the auxiliary pricing rule is 
an equilibrium with quantity targets. We also note that one can easily 
deduce the existence theorem of Bonnisseau and Cornet [Z] from our 
existence result by using quantity targets which are always fewer than the 
total supply. 
In Section 2 we precisely define an equilibrium with quantity targets and 
we state our existence theorem. In Section 3, we present the model of 
Dierker and Neuefeind together with an improvement of their result. The 
proofs are given in Section 4. 
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2. EQUILIBRIUM WITH QUANTITY TARGETS' 
We consider an economy with I goods, m consumers, and n producers. 
We let o in R’ be the vector of total initial endowments. The technological 
possibilities of the jth producer (j = 1, . . . . n) are represented by a subset Y, 
of R’. We denote by Xi c R’ the set of possible consumption plans of the 
ith consumer (i = 1, . . . . m) and the tastes of this consumer are described by 
a complete, reflexive, transitive, binary preference relation <i on his con- 
sumption set Xi. The wealth of the ith consumer is defined by a function 
Y;: R: \{O} x R” -+ R; that is, the revenue of the ith consumer is ri(p, (71,)) 
if the price vector is p and the profits of the producers are rcl, . . . . rc,. 
We now describe the behaviour of the agents of the economy. The ith 
consumer maximizes his preferences on his budget set. The jth producer 
follows a pricing rule ‘pi which is a correspondence from R\ \ {0} x 
&, dY, to R’+. 
In the following, we denote by S = {p E R\ 12; =, p,, = 1 } the simplex of 
R’ and we let the normalized pricing rule qj be the correspondence from 
S x n;=, 8 Y, to S defined by 
We also let 
PE={(P, (Yj)JESX ii ayjlpe fi cPj(P, (Y,))} 
j= 1 /= I 
be the set of elements (p, (y,)) for which the production sector is at equi- 
librium in the sense that the same price vector “sustains” each production 
plan yj. 
We now state the assumptions which describe the framework of the 
paper. All of them are taken from Bonnisseau and Cornet [2] and we refer 
to this paper for a discussion on these assumptions. 
Assumption (C). For all i, (i) Xi is a nonempty, closed, convex, 
bounded below subset of R’; (ii) <i is continuous, convex, and locally non- 
’ Notations. If x = (x,,), y = (y,,) are vectors in R’, we let x y = zi=, xh. y, be the scalar 
product of R’ and ljxll = (x x)m be the Euclidean norm. The notation x > y (resp. x 9 y) 
means that x,, > yh (resp. x,, > ,v,,) for all h, and we let Ri = {XG R’lx >O} and R$ + = 
{XE R’lx 90). We denote by x+ the vector of R$ with coordinate max{O, xh}. For A c R, 
we denote by cl A, int A, dA, respectively, the closure, the interior, and the boundary of A. 
If A is nonempty, we let infx.A={infx.alaEA} on supx.A={supx~a~a~A}, and for 
r 2 0, &a, r) = {x E R’I there exists n E A IIx - all < r}. Given two topological spaces X and Y, 
a correspondence cp from X to Y, associates with each element x in X a subset q(x) of Y, it 
is upperhemicontinuous if, for every open subset U E Y, the set {x E XI p(x) c U} is open. 
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satiated2; and (iii) ri: R: \{O} x R” --+ R is continuous, x7? 1 ri(p, (rc,)) = 
p .O + c,“= 1 Zj, and ri(tp, (tnj))= tri(p, (nj)), for all (P, (nj), t) E 
R~\{O}xR”xR+\{O}; 
Assumption (P). For all j, Y, is nonempty, closed and Y, - R: = Yi; 
Assumption (B). For every CT, > o, the set A(G)= {((Xi), (Yj))E 
ny=, Xi x ny= 1 Y, 1 Cy=, xi 6 Cj’=, y, + W} is bounded; 
Assumption (PR). For all j, the correspondence Cpj, from S x ny=, 8 YI 
to S, is upperhemicontinuous with nonempty, convex, compact values and 
cP,(Py (.?Jj))= {tC’j((l/CL=, PA) P, (yj))ItaO} for all (P, (yj))ER’+\{OIx 
ny= 1 ayj. 
Before defining an equilibrium with quantity targets, we first recall the 
definition of an equilibrium. 
DEFINITION 2.1. An equilibrium of the economy 6 = ((Xi, bi, r,), 
(Y,, cp,), o) is an element ((XT), (y,*), p*) in R”” x R” x R: \{O) satisfying 
(a) for ail i, XT is a greatest element for di on the budget set 
(XjEXiIP*‘Xi~rj(p*~ (P*‘Y,*))}; 
(b) for all j, y/* E c?Y, and p* E cpi(p*, y?, . . . . y,*); 
(c) C~!“=,x~<C;=, yT+o,p*>O, andp*.(CE”=,x?--C,“=, y,*-w) 
=o.3 
To define an equilibrium with quantity targets, we suppose that the 
quantity targets are represented by a mapping fl: R: \{O} x ny= I aYj + 
R’. We also denote by J a nonempty subset of { 1, . . . . a}. The jth producer 
is controlled by the public agency if j E J. 
DEFINITION 2.2. An equilibrium with quantity targets of the economy 
d = ((xi, <i, ri), ( yj, cpi), (B, 4, w) is an element ((x*), (Yi*), P*) in 
R”” x RI” x R; \{O} satisfying conditions (a) and (c) of Definition 2.1 
together with: 
(b;) for all j$J, yj+ E~Y~, p* ccp,(p*, yf, . . . . y,*), and there exists 
q* E R: such that for allje J, y,* E aYj, q* E cp,(p*, y:, . . . . y,*); 
* Condition (ii) is equivalent to the fact that the preference relation <, can be represented 
by a continuous, quasi-concave utility function II, from X, to R which satisties, for all x, E A’,, 
all EZO, {x~X~~tl~(x)>~,(x,)}nE(x,,s)#~ (cf. Debreu [3]). 
3 In Bonnisseau and Cornet [2], Definition 2.1 is the definition of a free disposal equi- 
librium. In the definition of an equilibrium, condition (c) is replaced by xy=“=, x: = 
IL;=, y:+o. 
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(b;) for all h= 1, . . . . 1, CC;‘=, Y; + uh 3 B(P*. (.Y:)),,~ Y,T 3 oh*, and 
qh*=ph* if CC;=l Y,+w)~>B(P, (Y~)L. 
Remark 2.1. At the equilibrium ((XT), (y,!), p*), the quantity target is 
achieved, i.e., c,“=, y,+ + o > p(p*, (y,*)). As already noted, the producers 
j, Jo J, do not set a price according to their pricing rule. Nevertheless, 
if CJ’=, yf +o 9 p(p*, (.y,*)), then p* =q* and ((x?), (y:), p*) is an 
equilibrium of &. 
We also note that condition (b;) may equivalently be rewritten as 
follows: 
i Y:+o3B(P*,(y:)),q*3p*, 
j=l 
and 
Remark 2.2. The concept of equilibrium with quantity targets presen- 
ted above encompasses different types of controls from the public agency. 
First, one can consider the case where the public agency imposes quantity 
targets only on a subset H of the set of the goods (1, . . . . I}; that is, the 
mapping p is defined from R: \{O} x n;= 1 aY, to R” and condition (b;) 
is replaced by: 
forall htH,(~~y:+o)h8B(p*,(l.:))h.q:bp:, and qh*=ph* 
if (i, Y:+w)~>&*,(Y:))~ andford h$H,qh*=ph*. 
In this case it suffices to consider the mapping /?’ defined by /?‘(p, ( Y,))~ = 
B(p, ( yj))h if h E H and b’(p, (yj))h = (CT= 1 yj + a),, - I if h 4 H. Clearly, 
every equilibrium with quantity targets associated with /?’ is an equilibrium 
which satisfies the above condition and the converse is true. 
Second, one can consider the case where the public agency sets a 
quantity target only on the supply of the controlled sector; that is, the 
condition (b;) is replaced by 
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and 
qh*=ph* if j;J Yi* h 
( 1 
> B(P*? (Y,*)), 
In this case, it suffices to consider the mapping B’ defined by 
fi’(p, (y,)) + cjcJ yj + o. Then, every equilibrium with quantity targets 
associated with /?’ is an equilibrium which satisfies the above condition and 
the converse is true. 
Before stating our existence result we define the set AQPE by 
AQPE= (P, (Yj))ESX fi a?[1 PE 0 cPj(P, (Y,)), n cPj(P, (Y,))+Izl 
{ j= I I$J IEJ 
and i y,+w~ i X;+R\ . 
.j= 1 r=l I 
The elements (p, ( yj)) of AQPE are called the attainable quasi-production 
equilibria. We remark that, if (p, (y,)) E AQPE, it satisfies the condi- 
tion (b’, ) of Definition 2.2. 
THEOREM 2.1. The economy d = ((X,, +, r,), (Y,, cpi), (8, J), w) has an 
equilibrium with quantity targets if it satisfies (C), (P), (B), and (PR); if 
fl:R:\{O}x~;=,aY,+R ’ is continuous and homogeneous of degree 0 
with respect to the price vector p, and if 
Assumption (BL). For all j, there exists a real number 01, such that for 
all (p, (Yj))ESXIl~=( aYj, qEcP,(p, (Y,)) implies q.Yj>aj; 
Assumption (SA). (p, ( yi)) E PE implies p.(C;=, y,+w)>infp. 
CT”=, x;; 
Assumption (R). (p, y,)) E AQPE and p. (Cl= i yj + o) > inf p. Cy= 1 Xi 
imply ri(p, (p . yj)) > inf p. Xi, for all i; 
Assumption (QT). For all (p, ( yj)) E AQPE, for all q E nj, J Cp,(p, (y,)), 
(i) there exists hE { 1, . . . . I} such that qh > 0 and (cJ’=, yj+ o)~ > 
B(P, (Yj))hi 
(ii) p . (c;=, yj + o) < inf p .Cy=, Xi implies that there exists 
h E { 1, . . . . I} such that qh > ph and (CJn= 1 Yj+ w)h > B(P, (yj))h. 
Remark 2.3. All the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 except (QT) and (R) 
are taken from Bonnisseau and Cornet [2]. One can economically inter- 
pret Assumption (QT) by saying that the quantity targets mapping p are 
chosen in such a way that the controlled producers may set a nonzero price 
vector which satisfies the equilibrium condition (b;) and the total wealth of 
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the economy is sufficient to provide a revenue for each consumer which is 
above the subsistence level if the price vector satisfies the equilibrium 
condition (b;). 
We also notice that Assumption (QT) is made only on the attainable set 
{(YJ)~IIJ’=I ayjl CT=1 Yj+ o E x7=, X, + R: } which is compact. Finally, 
one verities that (QT) is a consequence of the other assumptions if 
C;=, ~1, +0 9 P(P, (Y,)) for all (P, (~~1). 
Remark 2.4. We do not obtain, in Theorem 2.1, the equality between 
the demand and the supply at equilibrium. The following example shows 
that an economy which satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 may not 
have an equilibrium with quantity targets which satisfies the equality 
between the supply and the demand even if one producer has a convex 
production set and is profit maximizer. Let I = 2, m = 1, n = 1, d = 
((Xl, <,, r,), (Y,, q,), (A J),o) with Xl = {(x1, x’)ER: 1x22x1), <, be 
defined by (x1,x2) <r (x”,x”) if x’<x’~ and r,(p,xl)=p.o+n,; 
Y,= -R:, c~~(y,)=(p~R:lp~y,=O}, P(~,~,)=(1.5,0.5), J=(l), 
w = (2, 1). The equilibrium with quantity targets of d is the element 
(x:, y:, p*) with xl* = (t, l), tE [0, 11, y: = (-t’, 0), t’E [O,O.S], and 
p* = (0, 1). Clearly one never has X: = y: + w. 
The following corollary is the result of Bonnisseau and Cornet [2] 
except for the fact that the definition of the equilibria is not exactly the 
same (cf. note (3)). 
COROLLARY 2.2. The economy 8 = ((Xi, =$, r,), (Y,, cp,), w) has an 
equilibrium fit satisfies (C), (P), (B), (PR), (BL), (SA), and 
Assumption (WR). (p, ( yj)) E PE, p (cl’=, yi + w) > inf p. xy=, X, 
and x7=, ~,+oEC~=, Xi+R> imply ri(P,(P.y,))>infp.Xi, for alli. 
Proof of Corollary 2.2. We add to the economy a producer with 
a production set Y,, , = -R’ and a pricing rule (P,,+ I defined 
by cp,+,(p, (y,))= {q~R’~q.~~~+I =O}. We consider the quantity 
targets represented by the mapping p defined by /?(p, (y,)) = 
Cyz: yj + o - (1, . . . . 1) and the subset J of { 1, . . . . n, n + 1) defined by 
J= {II + 1 }. We now define the revenue function ii from R: \{O} x R” + ’ 
to R as follows. Let K=((p,(p.y,))l(p,(y,))~PE,CT=, y,+w~ 
CTLx;+R’+); f rom Assumptions (SA) and (R), for all (p, (n,)) E K, for 
all i, ri(p, (n,)) > inf p . Xi. From (B) and (PR), K is compact; hence, there 
exists E>O such that for all (p, (x~))E B(K, E), for all i, r;(p, (7~~)) > 
inf p. Xi. From the Tietze-Urysohn lemma, there exists a continuous func- 
tion t: Sx R”-+ [0, 11, such that t(p, (n,))= 1 if (p, (z~))EK and 
t(p, (x,))=O if (p, (xj))&B(K,&/2). We now let p=(l/Ci=, phjp and 
fi(P, Xl > .. . . z,+ I ) = rib, (nj)) + bi(P, (xi)) n,+ 1 with 
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i [ 
ri(p, (xj))-infp.Xi 
‘(“(‘j)) (P.w+Ci”=,~,-infp.C~=“=,Xi) I 
+ (1 -GA (Xj))) 
m 
= 
\ 
if (ii, (nj)) E B(K3 El 
l/m if (P, (zj))$ B(K9 42). 
One easily affirms that the economy 8 = ((Xi, <;, jr), (Y,, ‘p,, . . . . 
Y ,,+,, (P,,+,), (P, 4, ~1 verifies (C), Ph (Bh O’R), (BL), Wh and (QT) 
by noting that Cyz: yi+ o B /3(p, (y,)) for all (p, (y,)) E Sx ny_‘: 8Y,. 
We now show that d verifies (R). Let (p, (y,)) E AQPE, such that 
p . CC;_‘,’ y, + w) > inf p . x7=, A’,. Then, (p, y,, . . . . y,) verities p E 
nr=, cP,(p, (yj)), c,“=, yj + o E Cy=, Xi + R’+ . Consequently, from the 
definition of ii, Yi( p, (p . y, ), . . . . (P~Yn+,))=ri(Py (P.YIL...~ (PT Y,))+ 
C(rJp, (P.Yj)) - infp~Xi)/(p.(o+C,“=, Yj) - inf~~X~~J1 P’Y,+l. 
Furthermore 0 >p. yn+, > infp .Cy!, Xi-p. (cJ=, y,+o). Consequently, 
?i(Pt (P.Y,h ...) (P.Y,+,)) > r,(h (P.Yj)) - rib (P.Yj)) + infp.X = 
infp.X,. 
Since E” verifies the assumptions of Theorem 2.1, 8 has an equilibrium 
with quantity targets ((xy), (y;, . . . . y,*+ ,), p*) and one easily affirms that 
((XT), (y:, . . . . yx), p*) is an equilibrium of d since p* y,*+ i =0 and 
Y ,*+1<0. I 
3. THE MODEL OF DIERKER AND NEUEFEIND 
Dierker and Neuefeind were the first to propose the concept of equi- 
librium with quantity targets. They use a model of an economy which is 
very close to that of Dierker, Guesnerie, and Neuefeind [4]. The purpose 
of this section is to present an existence theorem which improves the result 
of Dierker and Neuefeind. For this, we use the result proven in Bonnisseau 
[ 1 ] which generalizes the results of Dierker, Guesnerie, and Neuefeind. 
We now introduce some notations. To a partition of the set of goods 
{ 1, . . . . f} in two nonempty subsets I’ and Oj, we associate the subspaces 
RI’= (uER’luh=Oifh$Zi} and R”‘= {ueR’Iu,,=Oifh$Oj) and we 
denote by xl,, or simply x,, (resp. xl o, or x0,) the projection on R” (resp. 
R”‘) of a vector x in R’, i.e., (xl ,,)h = x,, if h E I’ and (xl ,,)h = 0 if h $ Zj, and 
similarly for x( o,. 
We now present the model of Dierker, Guesnerie, and Neuefeind. The 
consumption sector is identical to the one presented in Section 2. 
The production is quite different from the one presented in Section 2. 
Indeed, one distinguishes between the nth producer who has a convex 
production set and who maximizes his profit and the (n - 1) previous ones 
540 JEAN-MARC BONNISSEAU 
for whom one can distinguish a priori the inputs from the outputs. 
Formally, we posit: 
Assumption (P’). For all ,i = 1, . . . . n - 1. 
(i) there exists a partition of the set { 1, . . . . I} into two nonempty 
subsets I’ and 0’ such that for every v E Y,, y,, 6 0 and yo, 3 0; 
(ii) we let, for bg RO,‘, Y,(b)={-~,,1~EY,andy,,=b} and we 
assume that the correspondence b+ Y,(b) is lower semicontinuous with 
convex values, Y, is nonempty and closed, and Y,(b’) c Y,(b) + Ry if 
b’ 2 b; 
(iii) for j = n, Y, is nonempty closed and convex. 
In Assumption (P’), we do not assume that all output plans bj E Ry are 
producible by the jth producer. In the following we denote by Qj the set 
of producible output plans, i.e., Q2, = {hi E Ry 1 Y, (b,) # 0). 
The behaviour of the (n - 1) previous producer distinguishes the outputs 
from the inputs. The jth producer, j = 1, . . . . n - 1, minimizes his cost given 
the prices of his inputs and sets the prices of his outputs according to a 
special pricing rule @ which is a correspondence from R: x nJ:; Q, 
to n;:; R$ 
We now recall the definition of an equilibrium with special pricing rule. 
DEFINITION 3.1. An equilibrium with special pricing rule of the 
economy d = ((X,, <,, r,), (Y,), @, 0) verifying (P’) is an element 
((x:), (y,*), p*) of R” x R’” x R’+ \{O} satisfying conditions (a) and (c) of 
Definition 2.1 together with 
(d) for all j = 1, . . . . n - 1, y,* E Y, and a,* = y;,,, b,? = ,vi”;,, verify 
. -UT minimizes p; . a on Y, (b,! ) (cost minimization); 
l (p;,, . . . . p&f) E @(p*, b :, . . . . b,*_ , ) (special pricing rule); 
l for j = n, y,* maximizes p* . y on Y, (profit maximization). 
In this model, the planning agency controls the (n - 1) previous 
producers and it sets a quantity target for the goods which are produced 
by these producers. Formally, let 0 = Uy:,’ Oj, let R* = {u E R’I uh = 0 if 
h 4 0}, and let xl0 or simply x0 be the projection on R*. Then, the quan- 
tity targets are represented by a mapping g from Ri x nJ’:/ RO,’ to R*. 
We now can define an equilibrium with quantity targets. 
DEFINITION 3.2. An equilibrium with quantity targets of the economy 
d = ((Xi, +i, r,), (Y,), 43, 9, w) verifying (P’) is an element ((XT), (y,‘), p*) 
of R’“xR’“xR’+\{O} satisfying conditions (a) and (c) of Definition 2.1 
together with 
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(d;) for all j= 1, . . . . n - 1, y;” E Yj and a; = yJ:,,, b/* = y&,, verify 
. -uj* minimizes p$.a on Y,(b,*), 
l there exists q* E Ry such that (451, . . . . q&l) E @(p*, bf, . . . . b,*- 1), 
l for j = n, y,* E Y, and y,* maximizes p* y on Y,; 
(d;) for all he 0 (cJn:j JJ,%)~ >6?(p*, b:, . . . . b,*- ,)h, qt BP,* and 
qh* = ~2 if CC;:: yh*jh > a(~*, (bT)Jh. 
The following existence result is essentially the result of Dierker and 
Neuefeind [ 51. 
THEOREM 3.1. The economy d = ((Xi, <(, ri), ( Yj), @, g, o) has an 
equilibrium with quantity targets if it satisfies (C), (P’), and (B); if 
S?: R’+ xfl;:; R”‘-+R O is continuous and homogeneous of degree 0 with 
respect to the price vector p; and if 
Assumption (SPR). (i) @ is an upperhemicontinuous correspondence 
from R: x nJ!z,’ LJj to n;:,’ Ry with nonempty convex compact values; 
(ii) for all (p, (y,)) E R’+ x &‘I,’ Yj, there exists (qj) E @(p, (y,,,,)) such 
that qjh = 0 for all j, h such that h E 0’ and yj,, = 0; (iii) for all (p, (bj), t) E 
R’+ XrIyZ: QjXR+, @(tP, (bj))=t@(P, (bj)); 
Assumption (SA’). For all (p, (yj))~R:\{O} xnr=, Yj, -yj,,, mini- 
mizes p,, . a on Yj(yj, o,), j = 1, . . . . n - 1, y, maximizes p . y on Y,,, and 
p . (Cy= 1 yj + a) G inf p . Cyzl xi imply that, for all (qj) E @(p, (.Yjl o,)), 
there exists jE { 1, . . . . n-l} and hEOjsuch that qj,,>ph; 
Assumption (R’). For all (p, (y,)) E R’+ \ (0) x n,“= r Yj verifying 
conditions (d;) of Definition 3.2, CT=, yj + w E X7= I Xi + R’+ and 
~.(c/n=~ y,+w)>infp.Cy=“=,X, imply that ri(p, (p.yj))>infp.Xi, for 
all i; 
Assumption (QT’). For all (p, (yj))~ R’+ \{O} x n;= r Yj, -yj,,, mini- 
mizes p,, . a on Yj(yj, o,), j= 1, . . . . n - 1, y, maximizes p. y on Y,, 
p.(Cy=l yj+w)<infp.CyZ,Xi, and cJ!=, yj+WECy=r Xi+R’+ imply 
that, for all (qj) E @(p, (yjlo,)), there exists je { 1, . . . . n - l} and h E 0’ such 
that qjh>Ph and cc::,’ Yj)h>g(P, (YjlO,))h. 
Remark 3.1. Assumption (SPR(ii)) does not appear in Dierker and 
Neuefeind since their assumptions imply that (~~1~ yj)h d @(p, (yjlo,))h if 
yjh = 0 for some h E 0’. Hence the jth producer can set a lower price than 
qjh and, in particular, 0. Consequently, it is not necessary to assume that 
he can set the price 0 for the good h. Conversely, in Theorem 3.1, we 
remove the following assumptions of Dierker and Neuefeind: (i) for all i, 
for all xieXi, xI,aO and for all y,~ Y,, y,,,dO and wlo<O; (ii)for all 
409/151/2-17 
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j, j’ in { 1, . . . . n - 1 }, 0’ n 0” = @a; (iii) the correspondence h-+ Y,(h) has 
compact values for all j = 1, . . . . n - 1; (iv) for all h E 0, ph = 0 implies that 
g(p, (bi))h = 0 and g(p, (b,)) 3 0 for all (p, (h,)) E R’., x JJY:,’ Ry’. 
Remark 3.2. In Theorem 3.1, Assumption (R’) is weaker than Assump- 
tion (D) of Dierker and Neuefeind. Furthermore, we replace Assumption 
(BRCY) of Dierker and Neuefeind by (SA’) and (QT’). This allows us to 
drop the condition “(x;:; y,),, > 9?(p, (y,I,j))h” in (SA’). Furthermore, 
one notes that Assumption (QT’) is made only on the set of attainable 
production plans which is compact. 
The following result is the generalization of the existence result of 
Dierker, Guesnerie and Neuefeind which is proven in Bonnisseau [ 11. 
COROLLARY 3.2. The economy 8 = ((Xi, & r,), ( Y, ), @, o) has an 
equilibrium if it satisfies (C), (P’), (B), (SPR’), an,d (SA’) together with 
Assumption (WR’). For all (p, (y,)) E R: \{O) x ny=, Y, verifying 
condition (d) of Definition 3.1, c,“= i yj + o E Cy=, X, + R> and 
p.(Crzl y,+w)>infp.Cy=, Xi imply that ri(p, (p.y,))>infp.X,, for 
all i. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2. We consider the quantity targets represented by 
the mapping 9 : R: x ny:,’ Ry’ + R” defined by B(p, b, , ..,, 6, _ , ) = 
C,“l: bj - e,, where e, is the vector of R” with its components eoh = 1 for 
every h E 0. We remark that the economy 8= ((X,, =$i, r,), (Y,), @, 9, u) 
verifies all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 except (R’) since for all 
(P, (yj)) E R’+ x FIJ’:,’ J’,, (CT:,’ y,lo,)h >%P, (yjlo,))h for every h E 0. We 
now define auxiliary revenue functions fj: R: \{O} x R” -+ R as follows. Let 
K= {(p, (p. y,))~Sx R”I (p, (yj))~Sx fly=, Y, verifying condition (d) of 
Definition (3.1) together with C;= i yj + o E Cy=, X, + R: ). From (B), K is 
compact and from (WR’) and (SA’), for all (p, (z,))E K, ri(p, (x,))> 
inf p. Xi, for all i. Consequently, there exists E > 0 such that for all 
(p, (rr,)) E B(K, E), for all i, ri(p, (rc,)) > inf p .X,. From the Tietze-Urysohn 
lemma, there exists a continuous function t : S x R” + [0, l] verifying 
t(p, (nj))=l if (P, (nj))~K and f(p, (xi))=0 if (p, (nj))$B(K&/2). We 
now let 
x infp.X,+(l/m). 
( 
p.o+ i 711 infp. f Xi >I , ,= I i= 1 
with F=( l/i, P,> P. 
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We remark that Fi(p, (nj))>infp.Xj for every i if (p.o+Cy=i rtj)> 
inf p .Cy= i Xi and that Fi(p, (xi)) = ri(p, (7~~)) for all (p, (xi)) E K. Conse- 
quently, the economy 8 = ((Xi, & ?J, ( Yj), @, 98, w) verifies all the 
assumptions of Theorem 3.1. Hence d has an equilibrium with quantity 
targets which is clearly an equilibrium of 8. fi 
4. PROOFS 
4.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1 
In this subsection we show that Theorem 2.1 is a consequence of the 
following result, the proof of which is given in the next subsection. Before 
stating this result, we generalize the framework considered in Section 2. We 
consider a pricing rule cp for the whole economy which is a correspondence 
from R’+ \{O} x IJ;= i 8 Yi to (R: )“. An equilibrium of the economy 
d= ((Xi, di, Ti), ( Yj), cp, w) is then an element ((x7), (y,*), p*) of 
R”” x R’” x R’+ \{O} which satisfies conditions (a) and (c) of Definition 2.1 
with (b) replaced by 
@“I (yl*, . . . . Y,*)EdY,X ‘.. xar, and (P*, ...3 P*)E (P(P*, (Yi*,). 
In this economy, PE= {(P, (Yj))ESx lYIJcl 8Yjl (P, . . . . P)E(P(P, (~j))} 
and the normalized pricing rule (p is the correspondence from S x ny= i 8 Yi 
to 5”’ (the n-fold Cartesian product of S) defined by Cp(p, (y,)) = 
cP(P3 (Yj)) n s”. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let E = ((Xi, <i, FJ, (Y,), cp, o) be an economy uerifving 
(C), (P), (B), (SA), and (WR), together with 
Assumption (WPR). (p = ‘pi 0 (pZ4 for two upperhemicontinuous corre- 
spondences (p2 and ‘pi with nonempty convex compact values respectively 
from S x l-I;= 1 aYj to X, a closed subset of an Euclidean space, and from 
x to S”. 
Assumption (WBL). There exists a real number CI such that for all 
(P, (yj))ESXFI~=, ayj, (qj)E(P(P, (Yj)) implies that C,“=l qj’yj>a. 
Let /3: R: \(O} x I-&‘= i 8 Yj + R’ be a continuous mapping homogeneous 
of degree 0 with respect o the price vector p which satisfies 
Assumption (SQT). (p, ( yj)) E PE implies that p,, = 0 if (x7= I yj + o)~ 
G B(P9 (Yj))h. 
Then d has an equilibrium ((XT), ( y,? ), p* ) which satisfies ~~=, y,? + co 2 
B(P*, (vi*)). 
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We now come to the proof of Theorem 2.1. For all t 3 0, we let QPE, = 
{(P, (~~))~Sxnj’=, a~lP~nje.,@,(P, (Y,)), n,,J@i(P, (~~))#125, and 
CJ’= 1 yj + o + te E X7= 1 Xi + R’+ }. Since B verities (PR) and (B), for all 
t 30, QPE, is compact and clearly QPE, = AQPE. From Assumptions 
(QT) and (PR), one then deduces that there exists t > 0 small enough such 
that for all (p, (JJ~))E QPE,, f or all qE njEJ CpJp, (y,)), the assump- 
tion (QT) is satisfied. 
From the Tiezte-Urysohn lemma, there exists a function 
I.:n;=,8Yj-[0,1] such that E.((y,))=l if ~~=,J,+~E~~~~X,+R~ 
and~((yj))=OifC,“=,yi+o+te~C~=‘=,i+R:. 
We now define an auxiliary mapping a: R: x I’$‘= 1 aYj -+ R’ by 
f/p, (vj)) = 4(yj)) P(P, (Y,)) + (1 -J-((Yj)))Ejn= 1 Yj+ 0 - eh where I e = 
3 . . . . 1). We define the correspondence x from S x n;= 1 a Yj x S” to R + by 
X(P? (Yj), (4j)) 
= uER’+IUhEIO,min{qjhIjEJ)] 
i 
u,=min{q,,~j~J} if E/n=l Yj+4h<zj(P3 (Yj)) 
if (EYE, Yj+w)h=F(P3 (Yj)) . 
u,=o if CC:=, Yj+w)h>F(P9 (Yj)) 
We now define an auxiliary pricing rule $ from R: \{O} x n;=, d Yj to 
(Ri)“. For this, let Kbe the set {(p, (yj), (qj))eSxn;=, aYjxSnlqj=qjs 
and [x$‘=l yj+o-&,(yj))]+ .q,=O for all j, j’EJj. We define the 
correspondence I,&~ from S x JJ= 1 8 Y, x S” to S” and $* from S x l-I;=, 8 Y, 
to S x n,“= 1 a yj x s” as follows: 
$l(P? (Yjh (4,)) 
= {(q~)~S"Iqj=q~fforall j4J) if (P, (Yj), (qj))EKi 
fi*(P, (Yjh (4j)) 
'[ 
Sj = 4; for all 
= (q;)ES”Iq/=(l -CL=, uh)-’ (qr-24) for all 
with u E X(P, (Yj)v (qj)) 
if (PY (4jh (4j) 4 K 
$*(P, (Yj)) 
= {(P. (Yj), (4j))l (qj) E fjl cP,(Pl (Yj))}. 
Finally we let $(P, (Yj)) = U(p.,(v;),(y;))E~2(P,(y,)) $I(P’, (Y,% (qJ)h 
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We end the proof by showing that the economy 2 = ((Xi, <i, Ti), 
( Yj), $, w) and the mapping fl verify the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 and 
that every equilibrium ((XT), (y,*), p*) of $ which satisfies c,“=, y? + o 2 
fl(p*, (y,?)) is an equilibrium with quantity targets of 8. 
Clearly 8 verities Assumptions (C), (P), and (B): We now remark that 
$(P, (vi)) = II;= 1 4%~~ (yj)) if Ed= 1 yj + w) 9 F(P, (~~1). Consequently, 
from the definition of fl, $(p, (y,)) = Cp(p, (y,)) if CJ’= i yi + o + te 4 
x7=“=, Xi+Ri. Hence 2 verifies (WBL) since the set { (yj) E ny=, aYjI 
CJ’= 1 yj + w + te E Cy= 1 Xi + R: } is compact. 
The arguments which show that & verifies (WPR) are standard except 
the one to prove that I++~ is well defined, i.e., 1 -xi=, uh > 0 if 
(p, (y,), (qj))$Kand if UEX(P, (yj), (qj)). If it is not true, then u=qj, for 
all j E J, since 0 Q u < qj E S. Furthermore, from the condition on U, one has 
qj’CCJ’=I~j+w-B(~,(~j))l+=u’1~~=,Y,+w-~(~,(~j))l+=o for 
all Jo J. Hence (p, (y,), bj)) E K which contradicts (p, (yj), (qj)) $ K. 
Before showing that 8 verities (SA), (WR), and (SQT), we prove the 
following claim: 
If (P, (Y,)) verifies (p, . . . . P)E$(P, (Y,)) and C:1=, yj+m+tee 
Cy=n_l Xi+R!+, then ~~nj,,cpi(p, (yj)), P~=O if (Cy=, yj+O)/z< 
/$p, (Y~))~ and there exists qE njEJ (pj(p, (yj)) such that p <q with ph = qh 
if(c,“=l yj+O)h>B(P, (yj))h. 
From the definition of $, there exists (qj) E ny=, qj(p, (yj)) such that 
(p, . . . . P) E fi,(p, (yj), (q/))* We now show that (P, (yj), (qj)) # K. If it is not 
true, from the definition of K, there exists q = qj, for all j E J, which satisfies 
qE CljeJ cpi(P, (Yj)) and q. CC~= I Y, + 0 - F(P, (Yj))l+ = 0. Furthermore, 
from the definition of $, p E (Jig5 qj(p, (vi)); hence, (p, (yj)) E QpEI. From 
our choice of t, there exists h such that qh > 0 and (cJn= 1 yj+ o)~ > 
/?(p, (yj))h. From the definition of 8, this implies that (c,“=, yj+ o)~> 
F(P, (yj))h, which together with qh>O contradicts q. [z;= 1 y,+ o- 
&p, (y,))] + =O. Since (p, (yj), (q,))$ K, from the definition of 1,6,, p= 
(l-C;=, uh)-l (qj-U) f or all Jo J for some u E ~(p, (y,), (qj)). One then 
easily affirms that the claim holds by taking q = p + (1 -xi=, uh)-’ U. 
8 verities (SQT) is a direct consequence of the above claim recalling that 
Xi”, 1 Yj + w g F(P, (pi)) if Cy= 1 Y, + 0 + te $ IX:= 1 Xi + R:. 
I verifies (SA). If (p, (y,)) verifies (p, . . . . p) E $(p, (y,)) and 
J$= 1 yj + o + te E X7= 1 Xi + R: , the above claim implies that 
(p, (Yj)) E QPEt and that there exists qE njEJ (p,(p, (yj)) such that 
p < q and ph = qh if (cy= 1 Yj + w)h > j(p, ( yj))h’ Consequently, if 
p. (Cy= 1 yj + o) < inf p. Cy= 1 Xi, from our choice of t, there exists h such 
that cc:, = 1 qh) ~ ’ qh > ph and (c;=, yj + oh, > &‘, (Yj))h 9 which implies 
that (cJn=, yj+ w)~ > fl(p, (Y~))~ from the definition of fl. But this con- 
tradicts ph = qh if (cy= 1 yj+ w)~ > /J(p, (yi)),; hence, p . (xy=, yj + w) > 
infp . ICY=“=, Xi. If CJ’= 1 .Vj + te $ X7=“=, Xi + R’+, (P, . . . . P) E $(P, (Y,)) 
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implies that p E n;= 1 Cpj(p, (y,)) and, since Q verifies (SA), 
p.(cJnzl yj+o)>infp.Cy=, Xi. 
8 verities (WR). Indeed if (p, (yj)) verifies (p, . . . . p)e$(p, (y,)) and 
CJn=lYj+wEC~z~xi+R: then (p, (_y,)) E AQPE and furthermore 
p . (Cy= I yj+ w) > inf p. Cy=, X, since d verifies (SA). Then, since d 
verifies Assumption (R), ri(p, (p . yj)) > inf p .X,, for all i. 
We now show that an equilibrium ((XT), (yf), p*) of d which satisfies 
C,“=l y,*+dRp*> (y/v) is an equilibrium with quantity targets of 8. 
Conditions (a) and (c) of Definition 2.2 are clearly satisfied and conditions 
(b;) and (b;) are direct consequences of the above claim recalling that 
f&P*, (y/v = /VP*> (.@)) since Cl’=, y~~+o>C~=“=, -u*ECEI X,. 1 
4.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1 
We consider the auxiliary economy 6’ = ((X,, $,, ri), ( Y, , . . . . Y,, Y :, + , ), 
cp’, o) defined for t > 0 by 
r:(p, (njj, . . . . n,+ 1 ))=rh (q))+(llm)%+15 for all i; 
Y’ n+l =(tl~‘e}-~x~R:l~lx,Pt}; 
cp’(P, Yl9 ...9 Yn, Y,+ I )=((pj)E(R:)“+‘I(pl,..‘, Pn)E(P(PI Yl?“‘? P,), 
P n+lYn+l~Pn+l.Y for all ye Y,, ,}; 
One easily affirms that there exists t,> 0 such that for all t < to, 8’ 
verifies Assumptions (C), (P), (B), (SA), (WR), (WPR), and (WBL) since 
YL+1 verifies the following properties: (i) YA+ , is nonempty, closed, con- 
vex, bounded above and - R: c YA + 1 and (ii) for all (p, y, + , ) E 
R:\{O}xaY,+,,p.y,+,~p.yforallyEY,+1impliesthatpER:+and 
P.Y n+130. 
From Corollary 2.2 of Bonnisseau and Cornet [2], 6’ has an equi- 
librium ((xi), (yf), p’) and, without any loss of generality, we can assume 
that pf E S. From the above property (ii) of Yi+ , , p’ E R: + ; hence, 
from (SQT), C;=, yf+oaP(p’, (yJ)) and Cy=“=, x:=zJ’ti yj+w. 
From Assumption (B), since YA+l c (tA”e} - Ri for all t < t,, 
((xf), (Y: 3 ...> y:), p’) remains in a compact set; hence, without any loss of 
generality, we can assume that there exists a sequence {t”} in (0, to) which 
converges to 0 such that the sequence ((x:), (yy), p’“) converges to 
((x*), (vi*), p*) E ny=, Xi x nJ?=, d Yj x S. Clearly, { yr+ 1 } converges to 
Cy=, x7 -c,“= 1 y,* -w. From the definition of Yi+ ,, one deduces that 
~~=,x,i*--~;=, yT--w<O and p* .(~~=,x,*-~;=~ yj+-,)=O. From 
Assumption (WPR), (p is upperhemicontinuous; hence (p*, . . . . p*) E 
@(p*, (y,?)). One then deduces from Assumption (WR) and standard 
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arguments that x7 satisfies condition (a) of Definition 2.1 for all i. Hence 
((xl), (yj*), p*) is an equilibrium of 6’. Finally, from the continuity of /I, 
Cy=, y.T + o 2 p(p*, (y,?)), which ends the proof of Theorem 4.1. 1 
4.3. Proofs of Theorem 3.1 
We use in this proof the same arguments as in the proofs of Theorem 2.1 
and Theorem 4.1; i.e., we extend the special pricing rule Qi and we trans- 
form the production set of the nth producer. 
We remark that, for all t > 0, the set K, = {(p, (y,)) E S x 
ny= , Y, 1 - y,,,, minimizes p ,,‘a on Y,(yj,o,),j=l,..., n-l,y, maximizes 
P.Y on Y,, and Cy= I yj + w + te E x7=, X, + R’+ } is compact from 
Assumptions (B) and (P’) and that t + K, is an upperhemicontinuous 
correspondence. Consequently, from Assumptions (QT’) and (P’), there 
exists t>O such that, for all (p, (JJ~))EK,, p.(~~=l y,+w)< 
infp.Cy!“=, X, implies that, for all (q,)e@(p, (y,,,,)), there exists 
js { 1, . . . . n- l> and hE OJ such that qj,,> p,, and (CT:: Y,)~> 
g(p, ( Y~,~,))~. From the Tietze-Urysohn lemma, there exists a mapping L 
fromnJ!=I Y,to[O,lJsuchthatL((y,))=lifC;=,yi+wE~~=,X,+R’+ 
and~((y,))=OifC,“=,y,+o+te~C~=“=,Xi+R:. 
We now define the auxiliary mapping g: R’+ \{O} x ny:t Yj + R” by 
a(P9 (Yj))hcA((Yj)) g:(P, (YjlOl))h+ll -A((Yj))) 
for all h E 0. 
We define the auxiliary special pricing rule 8 from R’+ x ny:j Y, to 
n”,; RO: as the composition of @, and Q2 respectively from 
R’: x n,“:l’ yix n,“r,’ RO, to n;:,l RO, and from R’+ x JJ’:,l Y, to 
R’+ x ny~: Yj x 11;~: Ry. We let, for all h E 0, J(h) = { jE { 1, . . . . n - 1 } 1 
h E Oj} and we state 
1 
u,=min{qj,( jEJ(h)] 
if (Z,~L: Yj)hca.(P9 (Yj))h 
@I(P, (YJh (qj))= (4j-uI.jIIu/zE Co,min{qjhlj~J(h))l 
if (C:Zi Y,)h=B(!h (Yj))h 
uh=o if (c::,' yJ)h > 'b? bJ))h 1; 
@*(P, (Yj))= {(P, (YjL (4j)) I (qjJE @(PT (YJ~O~))); 
'(P, (Yj)) = u @lb'3 (Y;), (q/J). 
(P'.(Y;). (q;))EQm.oi)) 
We now aftirm that the economy 6? = ((Xi, di, r,), (Y,), 8, o) verities the 
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assumption of Theorem 2.3 in Bonnisseau [ 11, i.e., the assumptions of 
Corollary 3.2. Actually, Assumption (SPR’(i)) is not exactly satisfied since 
6 depends on the production plans (y,), j= 1, . . . . n - I and not on the out- 
put parts of the production plans (J ,,O,). Furthermore, 8 is not convex 
valued but rather it is the composition of two u.h.c. correspondences with 
nonempty convex compact values. We leave it to the reader to check that 
these two differences do not introduce any difficulty in the proof given in 
Bonnisseau [ 11. 
d verifies (C), (P’), (B), and (SPR) since d verifies (C), (P’), (B), and 
(SPR). 
d verifies (WR’). Let (p, ( yj)) E R’+ \{ 0) x n;=, Y, verifying condition 
(d) of Definition 3.1, C;=, y, + o E cyZ, Xi + R: , and p . (C;=, yi+ o) > 
inf p xy= I X,. Then (~~1, . .. . ~~~~1) E @(p, ( yi)), which implies that there 
exists qe R’+ such that (qol, . . . . qonmI)E@(p, Y,,~I, . . . . y,- ,,0~~~) from the 
definition of 8. Consequently, (p, (y,)) verifies condition (d’,) of Definition 
3.2; hence, since 6 verifies (R’), for all i, ri(~, (p . y?)) > inf p X,. 
G? verities (SA’). Let (p, (y,))~ R\ \{O} xny=, Y, such that -y,,,, . . . minimizes p,, . a on Y,(y,,,,), j=l,..., n-l, y,, maximizes p.y on Y,,, 
and p.(cJn=, yi+o)<infp.C;“=,X,. First, if 
I:‘=, K+R’+, 
x7=, y, + w + te 4 
from the definition of 9, (J$,, y, +w)10 B 98(p, (y,)); 
hence, from the definition of 6, @(p, (y,,,,)) = di(p, (y,)). Consequently, 
since d verifies (SA’), for all (qj)c $(p, (1~~)) there exist Jo 11, . . . . n- 1 } 
and h E 0’ such that qjh > ph. Second, if x7=, y, + LC) + tee Cy=, Xi+ R:, 
from the definition of 8, for all (qj) E $(p, (yi)), there exists 
(q,!)E@(p, (y,,,,)) such that (qj)E@,(p, (yi), (4,‘)). From our choice of t, 
there exist j E ( 1, . . . . n - 1 } and h E 0.’ such that qih > p,, and (XI’:,’ Y,)~ > 
9Qp, (Y,,~,))~. From the definition of $‘, one has that (c,“:,’ yj)h > 
a(p, (Y~))~ and from the definition of @, , one has that qjh = q,h > p,,; hence 
G%? satisfies (SA’). 
As in Part II of the proof of Theorem 2.3 of Bonnisseau [ 11, one then 
deduces that the economy 8’= ((X,, <,, ri), (Y,, . . . . Y,, , , Yz), 6, o) with 
Y~=Y,+[{E~“~}-{xER’+I~:,=~.~~~E}], where e=(l,..., l), verifies 
the assumptions of Theorem 2.3 of Bonnisseau [ 1 ] for all E small enough. 
Consequently, the economy 2’ has an equilibrium ((xf), (y,C), p”), for all E 
small enough. One easily affirms that pE 9 0 and that yi = j: + zE with 
j;~ Y, and zEe {a”‘e}- {xER: In:,=, ~~2s). As in Bonnisseau [l] one 
shows that ((xf), (y’;, . . . . y; ~ r, j;), p”) has a converging subsequence 
which converges to ((xl*), (y,?), p*), which is an equilibrium of d. Further- 
more, from the definition of 3, since pE $0, one has that (CJ’:/ yy)10 > 
k&p”, (yf)); hence, at the limit, (X;:: y,*)lo 2 alp*, (J*)). Since 
C:= 1 y: + w B CT=, XT E Cy= I Xi, from the delinition_of 3, B(p*, (y,*)) = 
a(~*, (y,“;,,)). Consequently, from the definition of @, one easily verifies 
that ((.x*), (yp), p*) is an equilibrium with quantity targets of 8. 1 
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